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CRIMINAL PROSECUTION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWBREAKERS:
A STATUTE WITH NO BITE
I. INTRODUCTION
Surely, no one would be surprised to learn that without ade-
quate law enforcement and commensurate prosecution, a certain
percentage of the population would repeatedly ignore the law; envi-
ronmental law violators are no exception to this notion.1  The pur-
pose of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to protect
individuals from egregious risks that may negatively affect their
health or the environment in their daily routines.2  In 1982, the
EPA established the criminal enforcement program, and in 1988,
Congress exercised its full enforcement authority upon the recogni-
tion that it must combat environmental crimes in order to prevent
pollution and significant harm to human health.3  The program en-
forces compliance with the law by “investigating cases, collecting
evidence, conducting forensic analyses and providing legal gui-
dance. . . .”4  Additionally, the program aids in the prosecution of
those responsible for the criminal conduct of posing a threat to
human health and the environment.5
1. For a discussion of the development and history of the environmental law
enforcement program, see infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
2. See Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Dec. 7, 2016) (explaining
goals and purpose of Environmental Protection Agency); see also Steven P. Solow,
Preventing An Environmental Violation From Becoming A Criminal Case, 18 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T. 19, 20 (2004) (defining factors to establish “significant environ-
mental harm”).  To determine whether a violation constitutes “significant
environmental harm,” the EPA considers the following factors: (1) actual harm
that is detrimental to human health or the environment; (2) the threat of such
“harm by an actual or threatened discharge, release, or emission;” (3) the failure
to report any discharge, release, or emission and any dangers that may result from
not reporting; and (4) a “single violation that represents a ‘trend or common atti-
tude within the regulated community.’” Id. at 20.
3. See Criminal Enforcement, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
enforcement/criminal-enforcement (last updated Dec. 5, 2016) (providing over-
view of criminal enforcement program).
4. Id. (explaining enforcement program duties).
5. See id. (describing what program provides for individuals or corporate de-
fendants who have been charged with serious environmental crimes).
(97)
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An environmental law violation is classified as a white-collar
crime.6  This allows the government to not only criminally charge
individuals for white-collar crimes, but to impose sanctions on cor-
porations as well.7  An investigative partner of either the EPA’s
Criminal Investigation Division or the Fish and Wildlife Service ex-
amines potential environmental crimes.8  Like other criminal cases,
the prosecutor’s ultimate goal is to seek justice and not merely a
conviction.9  While the majority of these cases usually results in a
plea agreement, the Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) main-
tains successes in federal court.10  Between October 1998 and Sep-
tember 2014, the ECS completed criminal cases against more than
a thousand individuals and over four hundred corporate defend-
ants, which resulted in a total of approximately 774 years of incar-
ceration and up to $825 million in criminal fines.11  Fines are often
imposed to negate profits that are made from engaging in illegal
activities.12
This article asserts that the current criminalization for environ-
mental law violations is ineffective.13  Overzealous prosecution in-
vites over-deterrence and deprives criminal sanctions of their
“moral stigma,” while lenient criminal sanctions undermine the de-
terrence objectives and devalue the environmental laws.14  Accord-
ingly, Part II of this article examines the evolution and current
trends of criminal prosecutions for environmental crimes by focus-
ing on the two main federal violations: pollution and wildlife
6. See Environmental Law Violations, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/environmental_law_violations (last visited Jan. 22, 2016)
(elaborating on responsibilities of EPA).
7. See generally id. (explaining how white-collar crimes are penalized).  The
most popular penalties include fines, community confinement, paying the cost of
prosecution, restitution, and imprisonment. Id.
8. See Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice
.gov/enrd/environmental-crimes-section (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (explaining
prosecutors’ roles in environmental crime cases).
9. See id. (explaining prosecutors’ roles and procedure).
10. See id. (explaining environmental criminal procedure and potential
outcomes).
11. See id. (demonstrating success in punishing defendants for violating envi-
ronmental laws).
12. Environmental Law Violations, supra note 6 (identifying sentences imposed
when convicted).
13. For a further discussion regarding the effectiveness of the criminalization
of environmental law violations, see infra notes 140-150 and accompanying text.
14. See Charles J. Babbitt, Dennis C. Cory, and Beth L. Kruchek, Discretion And
The Criminalization Of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 1 (2004)
(explaining inconsistencies with reaching goals of environmental laws).
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crimes.15  Part III analyzes the overall negativity of the current en-
forcement program, criticizes the sentencing guidelines, and pro-
vides a resolution for overzealous prosecutors.16  Finally, Part IV
discusses the future impact on those creating a substantial risk to
our health and environment.17
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of Environmental Criminal Law
American citizens did not seriously address the impact of envi-
ronmental pollution until the 1960s, when Congress implemented
more precautionary and remedial measures to regulate illegal con-
duct.18  Today, the United States has almost five decades of experi-
ence with criminal prosecution of environmental violations.19  The
initial objective of increasing prosecution was to reduce pollution
that was damaging the United States’ air, water, and land.20  At the
time, the only means of regulating pollution was the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, which protected the “navigability of federal
waters.”21  Violators of this Act were strictly liable and charged with
misdemeanors.22  Next, the federal enforcement of wildlife,
through the Lacey Act, was and presently remains a strong founda-
tion to protect plants and animals from being illegally traded or
transported.23  The Lacey Act is the oldest statute that focuses on
wildlife protection.24
15. See generally Environmental Crimes Section, supra note 8 (last visited Jan. 22,
2016) (mentioning evolution and current trends of environmental law
prosecution).
16. For a discussion regarding the analysis of the current environmental en-
forcement program, see infra notes 140-244 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion regarding the future impact of the environmental en-
forcement program, see infra notes 229-244 and accompanying text.
18. See Historical Development Of Environmental Criminal Law, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division/historical-development-environ-
mental-criminal-law (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (explaining development of
environmental criminal law).  From the late 1960s through the 1980s, Congress
enacted the environmental statutes that prosecutors used for corresponding pur-
poses to regulate industrial pollution. Id.
19. See id. (discussing how America now has experience in handling environ-
mental violations).
20. See id. (providing background on development).
21. See id. (providing history on original Rivers and Harbors Act).
22. See id. (providing background on Rivers and Harbors Act).
23. See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 18 (ex-
plaining effect of wildlife prosecution).
24. See Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon In The Fight
Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND. L. REV. 27, 29 (1995) (providing
history of Lacey Act).
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In 1970, as a result of the enactment of the Clean Air Act
(CAA), Congress took an aggressive approach to criminal enforce-
ment; the CAA, as well as subsequent acts, treated violations as mis-
demeanors.25  It was not until 1980 that an environmental law
violation was treated as a felony under federal law.26  As a result of
the increased severity in grading, the maximum punishment ex-
ceeded one year of imprisonment.27  Similarly, the Clean Water Act
(CWA) criminalized storage or disposal of hazardous waste in
United States’ waters without a permit.28  This new law posed
problems for the “waste management practices” that operated
across the United States and subjected corporations and their em-
ployees to felony prosecution if “committed ‘knowingly’ by corpora-
tions and their employees.”29  The CWA and CAA are among the
laws that most commonly regulate pollution.30
The purpose of treating environmental law violations as felo-
nies was to draw attention and resources to the enforcement of en-
vironmental laws.31  The increase in punishment was designed “to
criminalize additional types of violations, to increase penalties, and
to add knowing endangerment provisions to environmental stat-
utes.”32  The EPA and Department of Justice (DOJ) demonstrated a
commitment to investigating and prosecuting environmental
crimes in order to protect the nation’s natural resources more
effectively.33
B. Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes
Pollution, particularly in waters, is an unresolved problem in
the United States, causing many individuals to suffer from exposure
25. See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 18 (ex-
plaining enactment of Clean Air Act).
26. See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: Evolution Of Crim-
inal Enforcement In The Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1223,
1224 (2009) (explaining introduction of environmental laws as felonies).
27. See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 18 (pro-
viding background on development).
28. See 33 U.S.C. §1319(c) (2006) (elaborating on Act’s requirements).
29. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1224 (explaining potential problems with
new Clean Water Act).
30. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Criminal Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws, 9
ENVTL. LAW. 1, 15 (2002) (illustrating most common pollution statutes).
31. See Historical Development of Environmental Criminal Law, supra note 18 (jus-
tifying creation of felonies for environmental laws).
32. Reitze, supra note 30, at 10 (explaining increase in criminal penalties).
33. See id. (giving reasons for stringent change in environmental violations).
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to hazardous chemicals.34  With a goal of maintaining America’s re-
nowned beauty, Congress has enacted numerous laws to ensure
healthy air, non-polluted waters for fishing, and uncontaminated
land.35  Furthermore, in order to deter illegal polluting, legislators
added criminal provisions to statutes.36  These laws focus on indi-
viduals or corporations that knowingly and consciously break the
law.37  Congress’ primary objective in introducing criminal prosecu-
tion to environmental laws was to prevent businesses that break
these laws from gaining an advantage over competitors who comply
with the laws.38  Moreover, the criminal consequences convey a
message to the public that pollution is abhorrent to the country.39
Today, the CWA provides a basic framework for monitoring any dis-
charge of water pollutants and “regulating quality standards for sur-
face waters in the United States.”40
34. See generally Mark W. Schneider, Criminal Enforcement Of Federal Water Pollu-
tion Laws In An Era Of Deregulation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 642, 642 (1982)
(explaining prominent problem with pollution).
35. See Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/enrd/prosecution-federal-pollution-crimes (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (ex-
plaining why laws have been enacted for pollution).
36. See id. (explaining goals in enacting such laws); see also Act to Prevent Pol-
lution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912 (2015); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1992); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1990); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERLA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2002); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2002); Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-
11050 (1986); Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-798 (1974); Federal Hazardous Material Transportation Law, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5127 (2005); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2004); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4910 (1978); Ocean
Dumping Act (ODA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1974); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1978); Ports and Waterways Safety
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (2002); Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1983); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1984); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26
(1996); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1328 (1977); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2692 (1986) (listing federal pollution crimes).
37. See Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes, supra note 35 (discussing targets of
new law).
38. See id. (explaining goal of implementing criminal prosecution).
39. See id. (demonstrating negative effects of pollution).  The government typ-
ically bears the burden of proof by demonstrating the defendant engaged in pollu-
tion and possessed the requisite intent, “knowingly.” Id.  It is insufficient to show
that the conduct was a mistake. Id.
40. Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa
.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last updated Sept. 8, 2016) (sum-
marizing Clean Water Act regulations).
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C. The Clean Water Act
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (the Refuse Act) had an
important influence on the deliberations for the CWA.41  The Re-
fuse Act and the CWA predominantly regulate water pollutants.42
Before 1982, the EPA pursued twenty-five criminal cases despite its
initial intention to enforce violations civilly.43
Originally, legislators enacted the Refuse Act to control the
navigability of the waterways, but over time, legislators have used
the Act to combat pollution.44  Additionally, the CWA also prohibits
entities from polluting.45  The purpose of the CWA is to “maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
ters. . . .”46  The CWA authorizes criminal prosecution for “knowing
discharges of oil or other hazardous substances ‘in such quantities
as may be harmful . . .,’ but it is not . . . [usually] used to charge in
criminal cases.”47  Congress included misdemeanor penalties until
1987, when felonies were added to the Act for first-time violations.48
Pollutants that are banned through the CWA include radiological,
medical, and high-level radioactive waste.49  Further, the EPA has
41. See id. (showing influence Refuse Act had on CWA).
42. See Lindsay A. Larson III and Jean Paul Picou Overton, Representing Corpo-
rate And Individual Clients In Criminal Prosecution For Environmental Pollution: A Pri-
mer, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 113, 114 (1994) (illustrating most popular regulations for
water pollution).
43. See Jane F. Barrett, “Green Collar” Criminals: Why Should They Receive Special
Treatment?, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 107, 108-09 (1997) (discussing trend in
criminal cases before 1982).
44. See Larson, supra note 42, at 114 (elaborating on reason for Refuse Act);
see also 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988) (identifying statute).  Under the Refuse Act, individ-
uals or businesses can be prosecuted for endangering the waterways by obstructing
navigability or polluting the environment. See Larson, supra note 42, at 114.  Con-
trary to most criminal statutes, violators are not required to possess a specific in-
tent to be convicted under this Act. Id.  Regardless of an individual’s due care or
lack thereof, an individual may be found liable because “[t]he [main] purpose [of
the Refuse Act] is to require people to exercise whatever diligence they must to
keep refuse out of public waters.” Id. (citing United States v. White Fuel Corp.,
498 F.2d 619 (1st Cir. 1984)).  Defendants most commonly respond to a Refuse Act
violation by asserting that their actions were in accordance with an issued permit.
Id.
45. See Larson, supra note 42, at 114 (discussing prohibitions under CWA).
46. See Christopher Huber et al., Environmental Crimes, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
607, 651 (1996) (discussing purpose of CWA).
47. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1243 n.103 (explaining purpose of CWA).
48. See Barrett, supra note 43, at 108-09 (discussing felonies in provision of
CWA).
49. See Huber, supra note 46, at 653-54 (explaining which discharges are
banned).
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broad discretion in establishing water quality standards and modify-
ing “effluent limitations.”50
Similar to the Refuse Act, the CWA does not require a specific
criminal intent for negligent violations of the environmental pol-
icy.51  Contrary to the Refuse Act, however, the CWA contains a pro-
vision that mandates immediate notification to the federal
government agency upon illegal discharge.52  Immunity is awarded
to natural persons who provide the proper notification under Sec-
tion 1321(b)(5), which prevents the reported pollution from being
used against him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution.53
D. Prosecution of Wildlife Crime
1. Congress’ Motivation and Role
Congress enacted the Lacey Act in 1900 to impose federal en-
forcement on those who disregard wildlife protection laws.54  Spe-
cifically, this Act makes it a federal crime to violate the “wildlife laws
of any state, tribe, or foreign country, and then move or trade the
wildlife across [United States] borders.”55
Because states were responsible for regulating over-hunting
wildlife, Congress’ objective was to help state laws combat the inter-
state commerce of wildlife.56  After several amendments, the Lacey
Act’s current main focus is to prohibit international and interstate
wildlife trafficking.57  The Lacey Act strictly prohibits the failure to
make indications for wildlife shipments, as well as prohibits trade in
wildlife, plants, or fish that have been illegally “taken, possessed,
50. See id. (demonstrating EPA’s role relative to CWA).
51. See Larson, supra note 42, at 128 (differentiating between Refuse Act and
CWA).  The government only bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that a
willful act occurred. Id.  Knowledge of endangerment violations pursuant to Sec-
tion 1319(c)(3)(B), “actual belief” or “actual awareness” of imminent danger is
sufficient to meet the requisite level of intent. Id.
52. See id. (distinguishing CWA from Refuse Act).
53. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 2014) (discussing when immunity is awarded
to natural persons); see also Larson, supra note 42, at 128 (explaining how immu-
nity exists for individuals).
54. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 29 (explaining purpose of enacting Lacey
Act).
55. See Prosecution of Federal Pollution Crimes, supra note 35 (providing prohibi-
tions of Lacey Act).
56. See id. (explaining why Congress enacted Lacey Act); see also Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988); see also Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
(BGEPA), 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2015); see also Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16
U.S.C. § 707 (2015) (identifying laws that protect wildlife).
57. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 29 (discussing main goal of Lacey Act).
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transported, or sold.”58  Both provisions subject transgressors to
civil and criminal liability.59
Regulating wildlife trade deters depletion or extinction of
threatened species and the importation of non-native species, and
prevents the spread of serious or fatal diseases to humans, animals,
or plants; it also bans both the inhumane transportation of wildlife
and the distortion of trade.60  It is also important for Congress to
regulate this illegal conduct because these actions pose several po-
tential environmental and national security threats to the United
States.61
Congress aims to prevent the environmental risks of decreas-
ing the biodiversity of plant life, animal life, and invasive species, as
well as the spread of diseases through illegal wildlife trade.62  The
national security threats are another serious concern of Congress
because they oftentimes lead to strategically planned crimes and
drug trafficking.63  Moreover, some terrorist groups fund their vio-
lence through illegal wildlife trade.64  This particular conduct is
unique to wildlife crimes, not pollution crimes.65
Congress has broad discretion when evaluating the United
States’ policy to combat wildlife trafficking.66  Leading analysts es-
tablished potential issues that Congress may encounter when com-
batting illegal wildlife trafficking, such as determining trade and
investigation funding levels; assessing the effectiveness of foreign
aid to wildlife trafficking; encouraging private-sector involvement in
wildlife trade regulation; utilizing trade sanctions to punish foreign
58. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372, 3373 (2015) (stating specific prohibitions of Lacey
Act).
59. See id. (discussing appropriate actions for violations).
60. See Liana S. Wyler and Pervaze A. Sheikah, International Illegal Trade in
Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (Mar. 3, 2008), http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/102621.pdf (explaining importance of reg-
ulating wildlife).
61. See id. at 1 (explaining importance of regulating wildlife).
62. See id. at 11 (explaining Congress’ intent and objectives for regulating
wildlife).
63. See id. at 1 (explaining repercussions with national security threats).
64. See id. at 19 (explaining how terrorists may solicit finances for violent
acts).  The limited anecdotal evidence that is publicly available points to terrorists
engaging in illegal poaching in several areas of Asia and Africa as well as smuggling
illegal wildlife to advance their finances and organized crime groups. Id. at 8.
These terrorist groups gravitate towards regions of high biodiversity to take advan-
tage of permeable borders, “weak states, and criminal sympathizers.” Id. at 19.
65. See Prosecution of Federal Crimes, supra note 35 (distinguishing between fed-
eral pollution crimes and wildlife crimes).
66. See id. (explaining Congress’ role in protecting wildlife from illegal
hunting).
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countries; incorporating free trade agreements; and addressing do-
mestic and international demand through public campaigns.67
2. Enforcing Wildlife Crimes
Several United States agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA), are responsible for investigating potential wildlife vi-
olations.68  State officers are authorized to investigate state
violations, which may then result in federal cases.69  In 1979, the
DOJ’s Environment and Natural Resources Section created the
Marine Sources Section (MSS) due to an increase in complex
cases.70  The prosecutors from the MSS often consult with the Assis-
tant United States Attorneys and federal investigators, and occa-
sionally take the principal prosecutorial role.71  Prosecutors also
have significant discretion in filing additional charges, such as
smuggling, conspiracy, tax, and money laundering to supplement
the wildlife traffic charge.72  Because the demand for illegal wildlife
is highest in the United States, prosecutors face a great challenge in
trying to prevent international suppliers’ illicit conduct.73
To combat illicit activities, wildlife investigators use a similar
approach to those who work in narcotics enforcement.74  Some of
the evidence the prosecutors obtain against defendants charged
with illegal wildlife activity stem from “anticipatory warrants” and
“controlled deliveries of contraband wildlife.”75  When they learn of
what evidence the prosecution acquired, defendants are more in-
clined to cooperate and turn against the vendors.76  Disclosing such
information may result in a reduced sentence or immunity, de-
67. See Wyler, supra note 60, at 1 (explaining possible issues Congress may
encounter in evaluating U.S. policy to combat wildlife trafficking).
68. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 34 (identifying other various agencies for
investigation).
69. See id. at 34 (explaining who conducts investigations).
70. See id. (introducing new section through DOJ).
71. See id at 34-35 (explaining role of prosecutors in new section).
72. Id. at 36 (discussing broad discretion of prosecutors to add additional,
related charges).
73. See Prosecution of Federal Crimes, supra note 35 (noting difficulties prosecu-
tors face with environmental cases).
74. See id. (discussing approaches to preventing wildlife crimes).
75. Id. (explaining how evidence is frequently obtained).
76. Id. (detailing effects of defendant’s cooperation, including obtaining in-
formation).  The more compelling the evidence, the more likely the prosecutor’s
side will win in favor of the public. Id.  The defendant’s product and or services
may be boycotted since the public will believe the defendant is taking advantage of
them. Id.
9
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pending on the prosecutor.77  Moreover, cooperation and volun-
tary compliance are crucial to maintaining an effective
environmental enforcement program.78
The government creates a notable deterrence effect in the
community when suppliers are convicted.79  Enforcing the federal
environmental crimes emphasizes the importance of wildlife man-
agement by state, tribal, and foreign governments and reflects on
these entities in a positive light.80  Perpetrators of wildlife crimes
could face any of the following punishments: “prosecution of both
individual and organization offenders; repayment of the wrongful
proceeds; community service to lessen any harm inflicted; and for-
feiture of wildlife used in furtherance of the crime.81“
E. Corporations Are People Too
Corporations are expressly considered “persons” in the en-
forcement of environmental laws.82  Consequently, a corporation
that violates environmental statutes is subject to criminal liability.83
Corporations are also legally responsible for their employees’ and
agents’ actions.84  It is rare for a corporation to gain exemption
from liability by claiming its conduct resulted from “independent,
misguided employees,” which is why a corporation cannot exoner-
ate itself from a violation by pointing to the illegal conduct of one
of its employees.85  “[T]his . . . applie[s] [in] [demonstrating] the
liability of a ‘well-intentioned’ municipal corporation under the
[CWA].”86  Additionally, “corporate officers are [held accountable]
for [ ] [actions] . . . within their [explicit] knowledge and con-
77. Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1133, 1159
(June 1986), http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1537&
context=llr (discussing effect of cooperation with government on sentencing).
78. See id. (explaining how to maintain effective program).
79. See id. (discussing government impact on prosecution).
80. See id. (discussing significance of enforcing wildlife crimes).
81. See Prosecution of Federal Crimes, supra note 35 (illustrating possible penal-
ties defendants face).
82. McMurry, supra note 77, at 1155 (defining corporations with respect to
statute).
83. See id. (explaining how corporations are subject to liability).
84. See id. (explaining corporations role in conjunction with its employees).
The courts impose this standard of liability because employees’ knowledge repre-
sents the knowledge of the corporation. Id.
85. See id. at 1155-56 (elaborating on corporations’ liability).
86. See id. at 1156 (quoting United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978)) (demonstrating how liability is applied to environmental
statutes).
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trol.”87  The governing case on this issue, United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc.88, determined that “person” is to be interpreted broadly
to target any individual or corporation that manages regulated ma-
terial and conduct despite the level of severity.89  To mitigate con-
flicts of interests that may arise between an employee and
corporation, the environmental statutes protect employees from be-
ing fired and also suggest procedures for reporting violations.90
F. Defending Environmental Crimes
Constitutional defenses are known to have limited success for
environmental law crimes.91  The defense that fails most commonly
claims that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) violated
the non-delegation doctrine between state and executive authori-
ties.92  Courts have continually upheld that Congress has the au-
thority to delegate powers to the EPA, despite the EPA’s status as a
regulatory agency.93  Furthermore, several courts have also rejected
a defense that alleges environmental statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, thus, violating citizens’ due process rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment.94  Finally, courts have also rejected the notion
“that federal statutes exceed federal authority under the
[C]ommerce [C]lause[.]”95
Defendants who wish to raise a Fourth Amendment defense,
alleging that a government party conducted an unreasonable
search or seizure, need to show that they had a “legitimate expecta-
tion[ ] of privacy[ ]” in order to gain standing to bring a claim.96
87. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1156 (explaining extent of corporate re-
sponsibility for criminal actions).
88. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d. Cir. 1984) (illus-
trating “person” as corporation), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
89. See id. at 667 (illustrating legislative intent for broad interpretation for
“person”).
90. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1159 (explaining how employees are pro-
tected from employer’s retribution).
91. See Huber, supra note 46, at 617-18 (describing constitutional defenses for
environmental violations).
92. See id. at 618 (elaborating on most popular constitutional defense).
93. See id. at 618 n.73 (citing South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.3d 646, 676-
77 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Mills, 817 F. Supp. 1546, 1552-55 (N.D. Fla.
1993); State v. Union Tank Car Co., 439 So. 2d 377 (La. 1983)) (explaining EPA’s
authority).
94. See id. at 618 (focusing on lack of success of Fourth Amendment
defenses).
95. See id. (footnote omitted) (focusing on failure of Commerce Clause
defenses).
96. See Huber, supra note 46, at 619 (illustrating requirements to raise Fourth
Amendment defense).
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The “probable cause” threshold implemented in the language of
the Fourth Amendment is lowered for environmental cases, which
reduces the government’s burden to obtain a search warrant in
comparison to the government’s burden to obtain a search warrant
in the investigation of other crimes, such as robbery.97  Similarly,
inspections under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) also allow for a lower standard for probable
cause.98  “The EPA has [much] discretion” in deciding if an investi-
gation is appropriate and necessary.99
There are caveats when raising a constitutional defense in an
environmental case.100  A defendant may be sued both civilly and
criminally when the government collects evidence of deliberate vio-
lations that warrant criminal prosecution or evidence of an on-go-
ing violation that requires injunctive relief.101  If both actions are
deemed appropriate, then “courts will issue [a] protective order[ ]
to [shield] . . . civil discovery [materials from the government] [ ]
us[ing] [that information] in [a] criminal proceeding[ ].”102  In
the event there are “contemporaneous[ ] . . . actions,” a defendant
may be inclined to raise a Double Jeopardy defense under the Fifth
Amendment; it is unlikely to be successful, however, because the
defendant is not subject to multiple criminal punishments.103
There are a few defenses that have great potential to be effective.104
97. See id. (footnote omitted) (exhibiting lower standard for probable cause
in environmental law); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (fur-
ther explaining probable cause standard).  Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, “a
search[,] . . . [with or] without a warrant[,] must be based upon ‘probable cause’
to believe that a violation has occurred.” Id.; U.S. CONST., AMEND. IV (providing
Fourth Amendment protection).  Probable cause is present if enough evidence
existence to “persuade a ‘reasonable man[ ].’”  Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 78
(1968) (explaining probable cause standard).
98. See Huber, supra note 46, at 619 (distinguishing lower standard imple-
mented for administrative probable cause).
99. See id. (explaining EPA’s realm of discretion).
100. See id. at 609 (explaining downsides to raising constitutional defenses).
101. See id. at 607 (differentiating between civil and criminal lawsuits).
102. See id. at 620 (footnote omitted) (showing how defendants have some
protection from Double Jeopardy).
103. See Huber, supra note 46, at 620 (footnote omitted) (showing lack of
success for Double Jeopardy).  A paramount Supreme Court case in 1997 estab-
lished that Double Jeopardy “protects only against the imposition of multiple crimi-
nal punishments for the same offense[.]” See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
99 (1997) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (explaining protections of
Double Jeopardy Clause).  The imposition of civil fines in addition to a criminal
prosecution does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.  The defendant,
however, is still subject to prosecution by separate sovereigns for the same criminal
conduct. Id.
104. See Huber, supra note 46, at 610 (explaining additional successful de-
fenses).  The defendant may be successful when he reasonably relies on an “admin-
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Still, ignorance of the law or legal rights is not a complete, persua-
sive defense.105
G. The Criminal Enforcement
1. Criminal vs. Civil Actions
Criminal enforcement is known to have “a [more]  [signifi-
cant] deterrent effect than civil actions[.]”106  While corporations
“cannot be imprisoned,” they can be subject to monetary criminal
sanctions, as well as exposition to negative “opprobrium” that is
coupled with engaging in illegal conduct.107  The negative criticism
that accompanies a conviction can harm the reputation and pecuni-
ary situation of a corporation and its future.108  “[A] criminal con-
viction . . . [also hinders a corporation’s] [cap]ability to bid on
[future] government contracts.”109  Civil enforcement for a corpo-
ration, on the other hand, appears to be “a cost of doing busi-
ness[,]” as the corporation merely incurs “[expenditures to]
defend[ ] the [suit] and pay[s] . . . [the respective] judgment
[imposed.]”110
The “willful acts[ ] [that are alleged in a criminal action] [ ]
are not [protected] by insurance policies, [n]or by the power and
duty to indemnify[,]” and as a result, are more likely to result in
“personal liability.”111  Contrary to traditional crimes, like robbery
istrative action[.]” Id. at 621 (footnote omitted).  “[R]egulations [that] were
adopted [inconsistent] to procedural requirements[ ]” may also benefit defen-
dant’s case. Id. (footnote omitted).  Both the EPA and the DOJ favor regulated
entities’ “voluntary compliance efforts[.]” Id.  The EPA is willing to exclude puni-
tive penalties if companies or public agencies “voluntarily identify, disclose, and
correct violations.” Id.  The EPA will refrain from making recommendations to the
DOJ if the party acts in “good faith to identify, disclose, and correct violations.” Id.
105. See id. (explaining ignorance of law is not complete defense).
106. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1157 (comparing criminal and civil en-
forcement).  Enforcement authorities have deduced that awareness of the possibil-
ity of substantial fines and/or imprisonment enhances the deterrent effect. Id. at
1143.
107. See id. at 1157-58 (footnote omitted) (explaining deterrent effects of
criminal sanctions on corporations).
108. See Carol Dinkins & Sean Lonnquist, The Belt And Suspenders Approach:
The Advantages Of A Formalized Environmental Compliance Program, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
1129, 1129 (2009) (explaining ramifications of guilty verdict on environmental
crimes).
109. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1158 (footnote omitted) (explaining
repercussions for corporations following criminal sanctions).
110. See id. (quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted) (explaining how
corporations cover costs of civil actions brought against companies even when indi-
viduals are named in suit).
111. See id. (footnotes omitted) (discussing lack of insurance policy
protection).
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or assault, those who violate environmental laws are typically emi-
nent citizens without a prior criminal record.112  It is undisputed
that the American criminal justice system has more experience
prosecuting these “traditional crimes” than environmental viola-
tions.113  Nevertheless, within the past few years, there has been an
increase in awareness of the propriety and efficiency of criminal
prosecution as a means for enforcing environmental laws to main-
tain the nation’s beauty.114  At first, courts were hesitant to impose
sentences for environmental violations; they then acknowledged
that harm to both the environment and any potential victims can-
not be measured.115
2. The Prosecutor’s Role
There has been much controversy concerning the govern-
ment’s possible overreach in pursuing environmental crimes.116
First, however, it is critical to understand the role a prosecutor as-
sumes in such pursuits.117  The DOJ allows prosecutors unfettered
discretion “in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to
prosecute for apparent violations of [f]ederal criminal law.”118
Prosecutors are expected to use common sense and good judgment
to amplify the utmost deterrent effect, ensure environmental laws
112. See id. at 1159 (explaining typical violators of environmental crimes).
Criminal sanctions also create the possibility of the individual serving jail time. Id.
“[T]he most compelling prosecutions typically involve repeated misconduct, which
compounds the wrongdoing and limits any doubt about the defendant’s intent.”
See David. M. Uhlmann, Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 215 (2004) [hereinafter, Prosecutorial Discretion] (describing
criminal sanctions and effectiveness for recidivism).
113. See Robert W. Adler, Introduction: Environmental Criminal Prosecution: Es-
sential Tool Or Government Overreaching?, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1097, 1102 (2009)
(quotation marks omitted) (comparing America’s experience with criminal viola-
tions to environmental violations).
114. See id. (explaining America’s new attention to criminal prosecution and
environmental laws).
115. See id. (illustrating reasoning behind imposing sentences).
116. Principles of Federal Prosecution, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Principles of Federal Prose-
cution (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Prosecution] (discussing controversy
of prosecutors’ roles).
117. For a discussion of the prosecutor’s roles in environmental crimes, see
infra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
118. See Federal Prosecution, supra note 116 (explaining prosecutors’ discretion
to bring suit).  Prosecutorial discretion is very broad with respect to environmental
laws.  In fact, critics argue that Congress has delegated too much authority to pros-
ecutors; the decision to pursue a case criminally may easily be determined by
whether the case involved a criminal investigator. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra
note 112, at 163 (emphasizing prosecutor’s roles and appropriate discretion).
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are followed, and avert any harm that accompanies violations.119
“[T]he regulated community” is skeptical of prosecutors’ discretion
because it is unsure “which environmental violations will [actually]
result in criminal prosecution.”120
The government dedicates extra attention to violations that in-
volve “false reports . . . and . . . fail[ure] to obtain [a] [ ] per-
mit[ ][ ]” for various activities.121  These types of cases assess the
“[efficiency,] effectiveness[,] [and strength] of the EPA’s regulatory
programs.”122  In particular, the veracity of these programs depends
upon “[the] obligation to obtain and abide by [ ] permits.”123  Fail-
ure to honestly report any pollution activity undermines self-polic-
ing and beneficial effects from encouraging environmental
protection, especially because the government now has no means of
retrieving the information.124  “The government . . . [lacks] the re-
sources to [ensure] every permit[ ] [holder] . . . [is] reporting [ ]
compliance status[ ] [both accurately and honestly.]”125  This dem-
onstrates the importance of voluntary compliance and providing in-
formation to the government.126  Illegal discharges without a
permit “are [ ] the most environmentally [dangerous] [activi-
ties][ ]” because there is a heightened possibility that the public will
be exposed to hazardous substances, which will then contaminate
the environment.127  As a result, the government’s primary concern
is to prosecute those violators without permits and anyone encour-
aging such conduct.128
119. See Federal Prosecution, supra note 116, at 1 (detailing prosecutors’ roles in
upholding environmental laws); see also McMurry, supra note 77, at 1163-65 (ex-
plaining expectations for prosecutors).
120. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 112, at 163 (explaining “regulated
community[‘s]” reservations about prosecutorial discretion).
121. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1162 (explaining importance of obtaining
permit).
122. See id. (explaining assessment of cases).
123. See id. (explaining importance of abiding by permits).
124. See id. (explaining failure to abide by permit rules undermines effect of
regulation).  Entities who provide false statements, conceal information, or ob-
struct justice are subject to criminal liability under environment laws and Title 18
of the United States Code. Id.
125. See id. (explaining difficulty for government to monitor all permit
holders).
126. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1162 (explaining importance to govern-
ment of relying on voluntary compliance).
127. See id. at 1162-63 (footnote omitted) (explaining dangers of illegal dis-
charges without permit).
128. See id. at 1163 (explaining dangers of not holding permits).
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3. The Effect of Sentencing Guidelines on Corporations
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission
(USSC) to provide guidelines and promote “uniformity” for federal
judges when sentencing defendants.129  The federal sentencing
“guidelines [play] an advisory[, not mandatory,] role” in helping
judges impose more consistent and uniform sentences for those
convicted of the same crimes.130  In 2004, the USSC amended the
guidelines controlling “compliance and ethics programs[,]” along
with business entities involved in criminal conduct, including envi-
ronmental programs.131  This proposed amendment did not specifi-
cally target environmental programs, but simply “appl[ied] [to]
compliance and ethics programs [in] general[ ][.]”132  The amend-
ment required that institutions exercise “due diligence” in order to
avoid engaging in criminal conduct within the business and to en-
courage “a commitment to[ward] compliance with the law[s][ ]”
within the business.133  The federal sentencing guidelines also ac-
knowledge that certain measures should be taken periodically to
mitigate any criminal conduct in the future.134  The importance of
these requirements derived from “[the] convict[‘s] [ ] culpability
score and . . . probation[ ] [conditions.]”135
While no sentencing guidelines tailored to environmental vio-
lations have been adopted as of now, the USSC reviewed a proposal
(Draft) that an independent Advisory Working Group on Environ-
mental Offenses submitted in November 1993.136  The Draft ad-
dressed the importance of compliance programs when passing
sentences on organizations found guilty of environmental of-
129. See Patrick J. Devine, The Draft Organization Sentencing Guidelines For Envi-
ronmental Crimes, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 252 (1995) (providing background
for United States Sentencing Commission).  This also helped prevent “unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records[.]” Id.
130. See Dinkins, supra note 108, at 1140 (explaining role of sentencing guide-
lines).  While the guidelines are not mandatory, it is required that judges consider
them. Id.
131. See id. (explaining amendment for controlling corporation criminal con-
duct within corporations).
132. See id. (explaining amendment to sentencing guidelines).
133. See id. (footnote omitted) (analyzing purpose of ethics program); see also
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
(2008) (elaborating on basic requirements for compliance program).
134. See Dinkins, supra note 108, at 1140-41 (explaining mitigating conduct).
135. See id. (explaining role and importance of compliance and ethics
programs).
136. See id. at 1142 (explaining proposal for environmental law sentencing
guidelines).
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fenses.137  The principal purpose of the Draft was to control organi-
zations, encourage commitment to environmental conformity, and
construct satisfactory environmental compliance program.138  Many
of the factors that were presented in the Draft proposal appeared
“in the sentencing guidelines’ evaluation of a compliance
program.”139
III. “EARTH’S MEDICINE:” ANALYSIS
A. The Overall Negativity
“The current [environmental] enforcement [program] . . .
[frequently presents] violat[ions] [of fundamental] principles of
fairness,” which ultimately causes the community to face serious
repercussions.140  For instance, corporations incur high expenses in
abiding by the “vague . . . environmental regulations[, all] to avoid
[the risk of] prosecution.”141  Additionally, individuals are in jeop-
ardy of being unjustly and disproportionately punished for violating
environmental laws.142  More importantly, the government does not
focus on its primary objective of effectively improving the quality of
the environment; instead, the government devotes a vast amount of
time and money to litigation focused on technicalities of the corpo-
rations’ and individuals’ compliance with the implemented laws.143
Meanwhile, citizens are left to “suffer [through exposure to] [ ]
137. See id. (showing which organizations are targeted). The proposal empha-
sized the existence of a compliance program at an organization and failure to im-
plement one would increase the level of culpability. Id.  The program must be
“document[ed] . . . [and] designed . . . in a [way] that . . . [effectively] moni-
tor[ed] . . . [the] environmental laws[.]” Id.  Conversely, “if [the] organization
[could] demonstrate[ ] . . . such a program [was established prior to the charged
offense], . . . [it would] reduce[ ] . . . [the] level[ ][ ]” of culpability. Id.
138. See id. (explaining purpose of proposal for specific environment sanc-
tions).
139. See Dinkins, supra note 108, at 1143 (footnote omitted) (noting factors
proposed appear in current compliance program).
140. See Alexander Volokh and Roger J. Marzulla, Environmental Enforcement:
In Search of Both Effectiveness and Fairness, REASON FOUND. (Aug. 1996), http://rea-
son.org/files/8c014ffde14ebd7a3ad267ae5bb85ba8.pdf (illustrating conflict with
principles of fairness).
141. See id. (explaining how businesses incur high expenses).
142. See id. (explaining disproportionate sanctions among individuals who vi-
olate environmental laws).
143. See id. (noting that government not improving environment through liti-
gation expenses).  Because the government is devoting much attention, time and
money in prevailing over the defendant, the objective of maintaining and improve
America’s beauty is not achieved. Id.
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dirt[y] water[s][ ] [and] [ ] polluted air[s]” that can subsequently
lead to health hazards.144
Environmental laws must not only educate the public about
what conduct is permitted or prohibited, but they must also set
forth proportionate penalties that deter the public from acting irre-
sponsibly.145  There is no bright-line rule that dictates how the envi-
ronmental enforcement program can achieve the highest
efficiency; there are, however, simple principles that should be
greatly considered.146  The program should explicitly assert
prohibitions in a clear and concise manner, predict punishments
for certain violations, and “[pursue] environmental improve-
ment[ ] [instead of] numerical enforcement[.]”147  In addition, in
order to protect the basic aspects of fairness, the program should
give the criminal penalties only to those who are “morally blame-
worthy[ ]” and truly responsible for the criminal acts.148  This
would require relying more heavily on “civil [and] administrative
penalties[.]”149  Finally, the enforcement program must continu-
ously act in accordance with the Bill of Rights to protect the citi-
zens’ constitutional rights.150
B. Statistics, Trends, and Remedies
The DOJ’s “Environment and Natural Resources Division [(Di-
vision)] [finished only] [fifty-three] [ ] cases in fiscal year
2013[.]”151  That number has gradually decreased since 2001, when
nearly five hundred cases criminal cases were opened.152  The DOJ
144. See id. (explaining consequences citizens face for pollution).
145. See Volokh, supra note 140 (laying out foundation for environmental
laws).
146. See id. (proposing principles to ensure effective environmental compli-
ance program).
147. See id. (proposing that prohibitions should be clearly and explicitly
stated).
148. See id. (explaining immoral and criminal behavior should be greatly
distinguished).
149. See id. (proposing alternative penalties to enforce distinction between
immoral and criminal behavior).
150. See Volokh, supra note 140 (ensuring program stays within citizens’ con-
stitutional rights).
151. See Carey L. Biron, Criminal Prosecution Rates for Corporate Environmental
Crimes Near Zero, MINT PRESS NEWS (July 25, 2014), http://www.mintpressnews
.com/criminal-prosecution-rates-for-corporate-environmental-crimes-near-zero/19
4479/ (recording number of cases DOJ concluded in 2013).
152. Graham Kates, Environmental Crime: The Prosecution Gap, THE CRIME REP.
(July 14, 2004), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-justice/20
14-07-environmental-crime-the-prosecution-gap (focusing on decrease in criminal
investigation for environmental law violations).
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has admitted to directing “more attention [to] terrorism cases . . .
[following the tragic events] of Sept[ember] 11, 2001, . . . [rather
than] to white[-]collar crime[s.]”153  “[T]he [main] concern . . . [is
that these] preventative [measures] . . . have [significantly] [ ]
weakened over the past decade[.]”154
According to EPA records, one analyst noted, “[M]ore than
[sixty-four thousand] facilities are [ ] listed in agency databases as
being in violation of federal environmental laws, but in most years,
fewer than one-half of one percent of violations trigger criminal
investigations[.]”155  Environmental statutes, such as the CAA and
the CWA, authorize the EPA to decide whether a complainant
should file a violation as civil or criminal action; the government,
however, typically decides to file civil charges instead.156
Despite the number of cases filed, penalties imposed, and years
of imprisonment distributed to defendants, there is no substantial
effect on the success of the environmental enforcement program in
improving and maintaining the United States’ renowned beauty.157
This regime is not receiving significant results, and in the process, it
is exceeding limits “of judicial [discretion], regulatory interpreta-
tion, and strict liability[.]”158  The mere fact that these environmen-
tal statutes are written so broadly, yet with so much complexity,
invites overzealous prosecutors to abuse their discretion in enforc-
ing these environmental statutes.159
153. See Biron, supra note 151 (discussing negative impact September 11,
2001 had on enforcing environmental laws).  The greatest impacts that resulted
from the September 11 terrorist attacks was that the Federal Bureau Investigation
(FBI) did not make as many appearances and EPA was dedicating most of its atten-
tion to homeland security. See Raymond W. Mushal, Up From The Sewers: A Perspec-
tive on the Evolution of the Federal Environmental Crimes Program, 2009 UTAH L. REV.
1103, 1117 (2009) (analyzing environmental crimes program after tragic events).
154. See Biron, supra note 151 (elaborating on decrease in preventative mea-
sures because of September 11).
155. See Kates, supra note 152 (discussing approximate facilities that are in
violation of environmental laws).
156. See id. (focusing on governments’ decision to file civil instead of criminal
charges).  The government is more motivated to file civil charges because the envi-
ronmental statutes do not provide a requirement of intent or knowledge of wrong-
doing with respect to civil enforcement. See McMurry, supra note 77, at 1136
(comparing civil charges to criminal charges).
157. See Volokh, supra note 140 (showing ineffectiveness of current environ-
mental program).
158. See id. (explaining overexertion of judicial discretion).  Judicial discre-
tion is supposed to emphasize the effect the offender’s sentence will have on soci-
ety. See Babbitt, supra note 14, at 52 (emphasizing importance of judicial
discretion).
159. See Volokh, supra note 140 (explaining overexertion of prosecutorial dis-
cretion).  Prosecutorial discretion emphasizes “fairness to the individual and . . .
ensure[s] . . .  offender[s] . . . [are treated] just[ly] [ ] within the judicial system.”
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1. CWA Enforcement, Improvements, and Mental State
Regarding the CWA, case law suggests that prosecutions are
not uniform or consistent among jurisdictions and similar viola-
tors.160  Statistics demonstrate that the purpose of enforcing the
water pollution laws, which aim to improve overall water quality, is
being overlooked.161  In 2010, it was “reported that [forty-four] per-
cent of rivers and streams, [sixty-four percent] of lakes and reser-
voirs, and [thirty percent] of bays and estuaries” were not safe for
fishing or swimming.162  Sanctions imposed on those who contami-
nate the waters are decreasing, however, and the penalties de-
creased by more than one-quarter between 2004 and 2008.163
Furthermore, many polluters fail to renew and abide by the
terms and conditions of their permits, which influences the magni-
tude of environmental effects.164  If the facility has filed a renewal
application within a reasonable time, the Administrative Procedure
Act authorizes operations with an expired permit; it is almost im-
possible, however, to regulate every permit holder.165  According to
the EPA’s 2003 analysis, approximately twenty-five percent of major
facilities defied their CWA permits’ terms and conditions.166
Many questions surround the appropriateness of the mental
state standard for these crimes and the courts’ lack of guidance in
See also Babbitt, supra note 14, at 52 (emphasizing importance of prosecutorial
discretion).
160. See Babbitt, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining cases have suggested inconsis-
tencies). Compare United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, 922 F.2d 54, 54 (1st Cir.
1991) (imposing fifteen months of imprisonment, no fine, and one year of proba-
tion for “knowingly discharging” hazardous pollutants in violation of CWA), with
Babbitt, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing United States v. Gienger Farms, where court
imposed only twenty-thousand dollar penalty for discharging 1.3 million gallons of
pollutants in Oregon’s Tillamook Bay).
161. See Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, Improving Clean Water Act Enforce-
ment, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.rff.org/blog/2010/
improving-clean-water-act-enforcement (illustrating that enforcement of CWA is
not consistent and frequently overlooked).  In fiscal year 2009, the CWA had 3,488
EPA enforcement inspections and evaluations whereas in fiscal year 2013, it de-
creased to 3,071. See Robert Esworthy, Federal Pollution Control Laws: How Are They
Enforced?, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/RL34384.pdf (comparing fiscal year inspections and evaluations).
162. See Shimshack, supra note 161 (providing statistics to support showing of
lack of CWA enforcement).
163. See id. (explaining decrease in imposition of sanctions).
164. See id. (focusing on repercussions for failure to renew and abide by legal
permit).
165. See id. (explaining expired permits are allowed in some circumstances).
Approximately fifteen percent of major facilities possessed outdated permits, ac-
cording to the EPA reports in 2003. Id.
166. See id. (providing statistics to show how many entities violate permit
laws).
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explaining necessary additional facts.167  For instance, an individual
may err and reasonably believe the conduct is lawful.168  When
hearing CWA violations, courts have had trouble distinguishing be-
tween knowledge of the law and knowledge of the facts.169  The
defendant must know a discharge has occurred and that it was done
in violation of a permit.170  Without the additional element of
knowing about the permit, this creates a challenge in differentiat-
ing among defendants who pollute in compliance or violation of a
permit.171
In addition to the courts’ lack of guidance, courts have incon-
sistently satisfied the elements that require a “knowing” mental
state.172  For example, many circuits differ in the level of proof nec-
essary to sustain a knowing violation; most courts only require proof
that the defendant knew the discharge was of hazardous sub-
stance.173  Congress’ choice to adopt the mental state of “know-
ingly” as opposed to “willingly” is appropriate because the
government bears the burden of showing the defendant knew
about the conduct involved and simultaneously emphasizing the
corporations’ and individuals’ responsibility to adhere to environ-
167. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1235 (raising concern with “knowingly”
mental state standard for environmental crimes).
168. See id. at 1237 (explaining concerns with mental state standard for envi-
ronmental crimes).  A defendant is likely to encounter such belief when the inter-
pretation of a law has changed or a new regulatory program has been
implemented. Id.; see also United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (showing mistake of law
is no defense for environmental crimes).
169. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining problems courts face
with CWA cases).  In CWA cases, the government must show the defendant knew
what was being discharged regardless of knowing about the law. Id. at 1237.
170. See id. at 1237 (specifying government’s burden of proof for CWA cases).
171. See id. (explaining importance for additional element in CWA cases).
The mere requirement of “knowing” does not distinguish among administrative or
civil causes of actions because polluters typically act “knowingly;” prosecutors’ dis-
cretion allows for them to decide which cause of action is appropriate, not Con-
gress’ limits. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 112, at 171 (emphasizing mental
state requirement).
172. See Reitze, supra note 30, at 28 (discussing circuit split regarding proof
required to show violations).
173. See id. (explaining inconsistency among court opinions).  The Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require a showing that the defendant knew of the un-
derlying conduct. Id. at 29; see, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir.
1995); Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286
(9th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating defendant’s requisite knowledge).  The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits, on the other hand, have demanded more extensive knowledge.
See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 265 (4th Cir. 1997); Ahmad, 101 F.3d
at 390 (demonstrating requisite mental intent among circuits).
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mental laws.174  To advance consistency among courts, the term
“knowingly,” with respect to all environmental crimes, should be
consistent with the interpretation used in criminal law.175
Other criminal concepts should be considered, like “the rule
of lenity,” which compels courts to interpret ambiguous statutory
language in favor of the defendant, and “the void-for-vagueness”
doctrine, which protects defendants when the meaning of a law is
unclear.176  The mere act of harming the environment and human
health holds substantial weight when deleterious and hazardous
materials are involved, which supports the argument that ignorance
of the law is not a defense.177  If courts were to make the legal igno-
rance defense available to defendants, then this would invite of-
fenders to “take advantage of the system by deliberately remaining
ignorant of the law or simply failing to acknowledge the law or their
knowledge of its existence.”178
The enforcement of the CWA should be revamped to ensure
better management and consistency.179  Fines should be more effi-
ciently advertised and strictly enforced to “exploit the spillover
effects.”180  Another way to advance compliance is to require pol-
luters and regulators to disclose related data and public accounta-
bility.181  If organizations publicize their strong commitment to
174. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1239 (explaining why Congress requires
knowledge rather than willfulness for environmental crimes).
175. See id. at 1237 (clarifying that appellate courts use “knowing” in accor-
dance with general criminal law approach); see also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.
184, 193 (1998) (clarifying that appellate courts use “knowing” in accordance with
general criminal law approach). “Knowingly” is defined as “proof of knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense” while “willingly” is defined as “the defendant
acted with an evil-meaning mind [such as] he acted with knowledge that his con-
duct was unlawful.” Id. at 201.
176. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1238 (proposing adoption of other crimi-
nal concepts).  “Void-for-vagueness” doctrine applies “if a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would be unable to determine what conduct is forbidden by
the law.” Id at 1233; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162
(1972) (defining reasoning for void-for-vagueness doctrine).
177. See Uhlmann, supra note 26, at 1238 (addressing mental state require-
ments for environmental laws as “reduced mens rea”); see also United States v. Int’l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562, 563 (1971) (explaining ignorance of
law is not defense).
178. See Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea And The “Heightened Criminal Liability”
Imposed On Violators Of The Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 377, 399-400 (1996)
(elaborating on unavailability of ignorance of law defense).
179. See Shimshack, supra note 161 (explaining enforcement of CWA should
be revised for more flexibility and better management).
180. See id. (hypothesizing advertisement of fines may reduce pollution).
181. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing The Clean Water Act In The Twenty-
First Century: Harnessing The Power Of The Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 794
(2004) (proposing “spotlighting” to enhance compliance).
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reducing pollution, this can increase conformity with the CWA and
reduce pollution in waterways to promote safe, clean fishing, and
swimming.182
2. Lacey Act Enforcement and Improvements
To further demonstrate the inconsistencies among criminal
prosecution for environmental violations, there has been much dis-
cussion regarding the sufficient nexus between wildlife protection
and the Lacey Act.183  Similar to the CWA, the mental state stan-
dard has been challenged.184  Congress has rid the Act of the
“double intent” requirement, “knowingly and willfully,” and has
amended it to only require “knowingly.”185  The Lacey Act should
be revised to have a specific intent requirement to demonstrate that
the defendant purposely and consciously violated the law.186
Another criticism of the Lacey Act is “overcriminalization,” the
prosecution of individuals for conduct that is not typically consid-
ered unlawful.187  Most of this concern derives from Congress’ deci-
sion to weaken the mental state standard.188  To remedy this issue
and alleviate criminalizing innocuous conduct, individuals and
businesses should be given a better understanding and clear-cut
provisions of the culpability standards under the Lacey Act.189
182. See id. at 794-95 (explaining potential benefits of “spotlighting” to en-
hance compliance).  “Spotlighting tools” had the EPA highlight regulated firms’
compliance records and performance by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System. Id.
183. See C. Jarrett Dieterle, The Lacey Act: A Case Study In The Mechanics of Over-
criminalization, 102 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280 (2014) (discussing problems with Lacey
Act).
184. See id. at 1304 (criticizing low mens rea requirement for Lacey Act).
185. See id. at 1290-91 (showing chronological evolution of mental standard
for Lacey Act).  Prior to 1969, an individual was subject to imprisonment “for a
mere ‘knowing[ ]’ violation.” Id. at 1301.  Then, in 1969, to ensure people with
good intentions did not end up in prison, Congress raised the standard to “know-
ingly and willfully.” Id.  The Act was then again amended in 1981, and the stan-
dard was lowered to merely “knowing” because of the level of difficulty the
government faced to succeed on criminal convictions pursuant to the Act. Id.
186. See id. at 1304-05 (analyzing negatives for lower mens rea standard and
proposing alternatives).
187. See id. at 1281 (defining overcriminalization).
188. See Dieterle, supra note 183, at 1282 (explaining origin of concern for
overcriminalization).  There has also been criticism that the concern that “over-
criminalization” derived from Federal Sentencing Guidelines has resulted in more
lenient sentences. See Babbitt, supra note 14, at 63 (describing various types of
sentences for criminals). Because of this, some violations are improperly treated as
a criminal cause of action, or, to the other extreme, actual criminal behavior is
punished too severely. Id.
189. See Dieterle, supra note 183, at 1305 (considering amendments to Lacey
Act to curb overcriminalization).
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Due to the great confusion and discrepancies that have re-
sulted from statutory language, Congress should adopt a standard-
ized mental state requirement in accordance with the American
Law Institute’s Model Penal Code; this would simultaneously ac-
complish keeping entities abreast of the laws.190  Specifically, this
approach would avoid “watered down” requirements, like those cur-
rently implemented within the Lacey Act.191  Additionally, this
change will have a long-term effect on separating those who inad-
vertently violate environmental laws from those who are sophisti-
cated, repeat offenders.192
In addition to altering the mental state requirement, the Lacey
Act included the element of exercising due care in knowing the
illegal nature of conduct.193  American importers can protect them-
selves from both criminal and civil penalties by exercising due care
when deciding which products are “legally harvested, processed,
and exported.”194  Congress, however, does not set a de minimis stan-
dard for what constitutes “due care.”195  Law-abiding importers
should have a set of guidelines to obey to prevent exposure to fu-
ture liability.196
C. Criticism of Sentencing Guidelines
1. White Collar Crimes v. Environmental Crimes
Environmental crimes should not be treated like white-collar,
“economic crimes,” such as fraud or embezzlement, because they
are categorically different.197  Thus, utilizing the federal sentencing
guidelines and imposing such punishment to regulate environmen-
190. See id. at 1304 (proposing standardized mens rea alternative to prevent
confusion in statutory interpretations).
191. See id. at 1304-05 (proposing standarized mens rea requirement similar to
Model Penal Code).
192. See id. at 1305 (explaining long-term positive consequences in utilizing
proposed standarized mens rea alternatives).
193. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 49 (explaining 1969 amendment to Lacey
Act).
194. See Pervaze A. Sheikh, The Lacey Act: Compliance Issues Related to Importing
Plants and Plant Products, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 16 (Feb. 25, 2014),
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R42119.pdf (il-
lustrating implementation of due care standard).  The standard of due care “refers
to the amount of attention and effort a reasonable person would expend in a simi-
lar situation.” Id. at 16-17.  Congress’ intent in imposing this standard was to mini-
mize random enforcement efforts. Id.
195. See Dieterle, supra note 183, at 1303 (discussing Congress’ intention for
“due care” and why Congress should implement guidelines).
196. See id. (explaining how importers would benefit from set guidelines).
197. See Devine, supra note 129, at 294 (explaining severity of environmental
crimes).
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tal criminal conduct is unnecessary.198  Environmental crimes in-
volve the criteria of accountability, such as negligence and strict
liability, unlike economic, white-collar crimes.199  Second, environ-
mental statutes are enacted in furtherance of monitoring conduct
that directly impacts the environment, whereas white-collar crime
statutes merely create elements of the offense.200  Finally and most
importantly, environmental crimes are not easily cured by restitu-
tion to the victim, unlike most economic crimes.201  Environmental
harms, such as destruction of ecosystems, long-term pollution, and
the extinction of species, may never be remedied.202  These dam-
ages to the environment create a more egregious risk that simply
cannot be addressed in accordance to the economic crimes’
philosophies.203
The development of federal environmental crimes is still rela-
tively new and convictions are rare; for this reason, the sentencing
statistics are not a dependable source of determining whether
courts will distribute such sanctions uniformly.204  There is minimal
evidence to support a historic disparity in sentencing for environ-
mental violations.205  As a result, it would be moot to introduce
specific environmental sentencing guidelines.206  The federal sen-
tencing guidelines’ main objective is still achieved in ensuring a re-
duction in disparity between sentences for similar crimes by similar
offenders without adopting this amendment of incorporating fed-
eral sentencing guidelines.207
198. See id. (explaining reason for unnecessary guidelines).
199. See id. (comparing and contrasting economic crimes from environmental
crimes).
200. See id. (comparing and contrasting economic crimes from environmental
crimes).
201. See id. (explaining why restitution remedy is more appropriate for eco-
nomic crimes than environmental crimes).
202. See Devine, supra note 129, at 294-95 (explaining environmental harms
may never be remedied).
203. See id. at 295 (explaining damages to environment cause substantial
health hazards).
204. See id. at 297 (showing sentencing statistics are not reliable for relatively
new environmental crime category).
205. See id. at 296 (explaining irrelevance for adopting sentencing guidelines
specific to environmental laws based on history of enforcing environmental
crimes).
206. See id. (explaining environmental enforcement program’s relative new-
ness and negative repercussions).
207. See Devine, supra note 129, at 297-98 (elaborating on objectives of Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines).
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2. The Immaterial Proposal
The Draft that was initially proposed to the USSC in November
1993 had deficiencies that made it superfluous.208  The Draft would
create many complications, including strains on the judicial sys-
tem.209  Following the proposed recommended provisions would
have led to excessive litigation and expenditures to determine
whether parties had any potential to decrease or increase fines.210
If Congress approved the Draft, a new body of case law would have
been needed to separate other guidelines, which would have frus-
trated judges and tested their patience.211  It would not be possible
to simplify the Draft without sacrificing Congress’ goals of efficiency
and fairness.212
Additionally, the Draft proposed severe penalties.213  To com-
pute fines, the Drafters utilized maximum statutory fines, which are
typically reserved for recurring and heinous crimes.214  The Draft
also prevented the issuance of multiple counts, even when the
counts arose out of the same occurrence or activity, which could
potentially “send fines for multiple count convictions in an upward
spiral.”215  The Draft gave courts discretion in determining fines,
but generally in raising such fines, not in decreasing them; there
were limitations on analyzing mitigating factors that reduced fines,
yet no restrictions on analyzing aggravating factors that increased
fines.216
208. See id. at 270-71 (focusing on proposal for specific environmental law
sentencing guidelines).
209. See id. at 271 (explaining how proposal would cause strains on judicial
system).
210. See id. at 272 (explaining proposal would increase frivolous, useless
lawsuits).
211. See id. at 292 (explaining proposal would require new case law).  In 1993,
a National Law Journal survey showed that corporations admitted to violating envi-
ronmental statutes because of the “uncertainty and complexity” of the laws. See
Volokh, supra note 140, at 8 (emphasizing corporations failure to comply with
laws).  Seventy percent of the corporate lawyers surveyed believed it was not feasi-
ble to fully comply with the environmental statutes. Id.
212. See Devine, supra note 129, at 273 (highlighting how utilizing proposal
would forfeit judicial and administrative efficiency).
213. See id. (focusing on severe penalties included in proposal for specific en-
vironmental guidelines).
214. See id. (focusing on proposal’s potential abuse for imposing maximum
statutory fines).
215. See id. at 274 (explaining negative effect for not allowing multiple counts
for conduct arising out of same transaction or occurrence).
216. See id. at 274-75 (elaborating on inconsistencies for judges to impose
fines).
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The harsh penalties included in the Draft raised serious con-
cerns for organizations and also placed a strain on the judicial sys-
tem.217  The proposed fines could hinder the eligibility for federal
government contracts and loans.218  The organizations convicted of
these environmental offenses would reasonably fear bankruptcy be-
cause they would be faced with overwhelming fines despite plead-
ing guilty or cooperating with the government.219  This would drive
their decision to risk their chances and request a full trial, which
exerts judicial and administrative pressures.220
The aforementioned reasons create a non-exhaustive list to
support the irrelevance of the Draft Guidelines; the list, however,
should coerce organizations to implement compliance programs to
avoid encountering many environmental offenses.221  Compliance
programs will preserve any future hardships and expenses if organi-
zations actively abstain from engaging in environmental crimes.222
D. Resolving Abuse of Prosecutorial Discretion
To both preserve the criminal enforcement of environmental
crimes and control overreaching prosecutorial discretion, it is rec-
ommended that prosecutors pursue cases that involve at least one
of the following aggravating factors: (1) significant harm to the en-
vironment or public health; (2) engaging in deceitful conduct; (3)
functioning outside the regulatory system; or (4) repetitious illegal
behavior.223  These aggravating factors have been selected because
they frustrate the effectiveness of the environmental protection pro-
gram.224  In particular, prosecutors should pay close attention to
217. See Devine, supra note 129, at 275 (illustrating how harsh penalties raise
concerns to entities).
218. See id. at 274-75 (explaining how fines affect corporations); see also
Dinkins, supra note 108, at 1143 (demonstrating how imposing fines affect eligibil-
ity for government contract eligibility).
219. See Devine, supra note 129, at 276 (explaining why imposition of fines
gives reason for corporations to fear bankruptcy).
220. See id. (illustrating exertion on judicial system because corporations want
to go to trial more often).
221. See Dinkins, supra note 108, at 1143 (explaining compliance program will
help control environmental offenses).
222. See Devine, supra note 129, at 299 (explaining benefits of compliance
program for organizations that avoid criminal conduct).
223. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 112, at 164 (establishing aggravating
factors for prosecutors to consider).  The most compelling cases for judges and
juries involve substantial harm. Id.  To provide more structure, harm should be
categorized as follows: “(1) serious bodily injury; (2) knowing or negligent endan-
germent; (3) animal deaths; (4) cleanup costs; (5) evacuations and emergency
responses.” Id.
224. See id. (explaining reason for choosing specific factors).
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“deceitful conduct,” as it sends a powerful message to the public
that unlawful pollution can go undetected and their negative conse-
quences will affect the environment.225  It also deprives regulators
of pertinent information needed to create an adequate permit sys-
tem and make sound decisions regarding lawful pollution.226
Providing the prosecutors with stricter guidelines would pre-
vent pursuing violations that have little to no legal merit; it would
also provide the community with a better understanding of which
environmental violations are charged criminally and the role of the
environmental enforcement program.227  In addition, prosecutors
who focus their energy on cases involving the aforementioned ag-
gravating factors will ameliorate concerns about
“overcriminalization.”228
IV. “A NEW TOMORROW:” IMPACT
Society has a compelling interest in reducing pollution and de-
terring illegal environmental behavior to both preserve the United
States’ renowned beauty and protect its citizens from hazardous
substances.229  Society has a further interest in ensuring that penal-
ties for noncompliance are not unjustly severe, disproportionate, or
inconsistent.230  An effective justice system, therefore, is dependent
upon the proper balance of the paramount roles of prosecutorial
and judicial discretion in order to impose criminal sanctions.231
Consequently, criminal sanctions are an integral part of the deter-
rent approach for environmental laws.232
The great inconsistences and doubts raised by the current envi-
ronmental enforcement program may cause future offenders to no
longer fear the threat of prosecution, which negates the initial ob-
225. See id. at 197 (explaining why deceitful conduct is most important
factor).
226. See id. at 199 (explaining effect deceitful conduct can have on reg-
ulation).
227. See id. at 164 (explaining advantages of guidelines for prosecutors).  Not
only will these guidelines limit prosecution for cases that involve the risk of sub-
stantial harm, but also for any conduct that is considered criminal in other con-
texts. Id.
228. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 112, at 166 (explaining how
prosecutorial discretion will alleviate concerns for overcriminalization).
229. See Babbitt, supra note 14, at 60 (explaining society’s compelling interest
in preventing environmental harm caused by illegal activity).
230. See id. (explaining society’s compelling interest in justly punishing
violators).
231. See id. at 52 (explaining balance for effective criminal justice system).
232. See id. at 59, 63 (explaining role of prosecutorial and judicial discretion).
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jective of deterring illegal, heinous behavior.233  The legal system
breaches its duty to society when there is a great disparity among
offenders who are sentenced.234  Sentences must not only be based
on judicial discretion, but must also be foreseeable in order for so-
ciety to discern the benefits of imposing consistent, economical de-
terrent sanctions.235  Accordingly, society’s compelling interest in
promoting stable, foreseeable, and proportionate deterrence will
be satisfied if there is a reduction in sentencing disparity and crimi-
nal sanctions are imposed when absolutely appropriate.236
The endless controversy regarding the role and effectiveness of
the criminal enforcement program for environmental laws validates
the substantial need for a stronger, standardized framework, and
provides for a better “empirical understanding” of its applica-
tion.237  Enforcing a new framework is admittedly difficult and a
perfect system is always a work in progress, but there must be af-
firmative action to effectuate positive changes and improve-
ments.238  Continuing or further relaxing the current investigative
and prosecutorial processes is definitely not a solution, or at least,
not a good solution to this problem.239  The current path may lead
to the extinction of some species of plant and animal life, poisoned
recreational waterways, contaminated reservoirs, ill-health, and
above all, death of American citizens.240  Cost containment, a fiscal
responsibility to our government, is among the charges.241  Because
of this, a better balance must be reached.242  As responsible mem-
233. See id. at 56 (explaining how inconsistencies in justice system affect deter-
rence objective).
234. See Babbitt, supra note 14, at 56 (demonstrating how legal system
breaches duty to society to treat offenders equally).
235. See id. at 58 (explaining why sentences need to be foreseeable and
consistent).
236. See id. at 63 (explaining how society’s interest can be achieved).  Crimi-
nal sanctions are deemed appropriate when entities engage in conduct that risks
or causes considerable harm to the environment and public health while dis-
obeying or seeking to operate outside the written law. See Prosecutorial Discretion,
supra note 112, at 215 (explaining when criminal sanctions should be imposed).
237. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 112, at 214 (explaining improve-
ments for enforcement program).
238. For a discussion on how to improve the current environmental law pro-
gram, see supra notes 167-182, 183-196, 223-228 and accompanying text.
239. For a discussion of the statistics and trends of the current environmental
law program, see supra notes 151-159 and accompanying text.
240. For a discussion of the environmental harms, see supra notes 61-65, 202-
203 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of the negative effects of the current environmental pro-
gram, see supra notes 140-150 and accompanying text.
242. For a discussion of why a better balance must be reached, see supra notes
229-237 and accompanying text.
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bers of society, American citizens are stewards of the environment
charged to protect and preserve it for today’s population and for
generations to come.243  Nothing short of enforcement and prose-
cution that attains this goal should be permitted.244
Christina M. Russo*
243. For a discussion of the purpose of the Environmental Protection Agency,
see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
244. For a discussion of the overall negative aspects of the current environ-
mental law program, see supra notes 140-150 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
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